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The discussion about General McChrystal continues, Mr. Herschel Smith from Captain’s Journal responds to my original post. He went into some detail, so I think it fair to respond to his arguments point by point.

This writer has done a good job of regurgitating the FM 3-24 talking points and theory (at least some of it), but it’s a sign of cult-like behavior to be able to stand in the face of evidence and deny its existence. My arguments weren’t about theory. Go back and read them again.

I wonder if Mr. Smith applies the “cult-like behavior” standard to himself, or is that reserved merely for people that disagree with him?

While it may seem that I am “regurgitating” from FM 3-24, how does that invalidate the argument? Is FM 3-24 so far off base that it cannot be used as a serious reference? I think not.

I stated that the best teachers are examples and stories. Theory is only good insofar as it benefits us. Where it fails to match reality it must be revisited, modified and/or jettisoned entirely. If our critic would have continued our comprehensive coverage of the Marines in Helmand, he would have learned not only that they killed 400 Taliban fighters in Garmser, but that following this assault the town elders implored the Marines for protection and security.

Mr. Smith seems to agree with me here that security of the people comes first. He also agrees that operations must be structured with that as one (of many) goals. He also agrees with me that this is a means to an end—a pragmatic approach to war—rather than some sort of ill-begotten humanitarian mission.

As far as theory versus anecdotal evidence is concerned, let me explain. FM 3-24 was written based upon actual experience in warfare going back to Napoleon’s fiasco in Spain. It was also written by a group of experienced field-grade staff officers. These same officers have Ranger and Special Forces tabs and hold post-graduate degrees (some of these officers were even Marines)—and the vast majority of them had actual combat experience (to include COIN) themselves with which to draw upon. In addition, civilians were brought in to help author it as well, in order to avoid incestuous groupthink. It is a solid document, and one which Mr. Smith has referenced himself on occasion.

Just how our critic supposes that the Marines could have protected the population of Garmser, while several hundred Taliban fighters were dug in and waiting for the Marines, he doesn’t say. But he makes the mistake of conflating phases of the campaign, and also of failing to understand that the campaign will require various lines of operation or lines of effort.

I could lecture chapter and verse on Jomini and his lines of operation (LOO)—-both physical and logical. Considering that the readers of Just Barking Mad largely are not graduates of the Command and General Staff College, I felt it wise to speak in layman’s terms (as much as possible). I also felt that a 10,000-word dissertation on Jomini’s philosophy concerning the operational art of war—and the U.S. military’s adoption of its core principles—might be a distraction from the subject at hand… but I digress.

Considering the fact that I wasn’t physically in Garmser, and I have yet to read a detailed after action report on the operation, it would be silly for me critique the Helmand operations in any meaningful way. Still, Mr. Smith fails to provide the reader with any evidence that McChrystal’s proposed policy would have affected the inevitable outcome there. Were human shields used systematically in Helmand Province to prevent the Marines from accomplishing their mission? We are left only assuming that it must have occurred—maybe.

Finally, he conflates the discussion topic – rules of engagement – with counterinsurgency theory. This is a mistake made in the Small Wars Council discussion thread on the same topic. Many participants in the discussion thread throw out the same meme. It’s better to back away or find another tactic than it is to flatten domiciles with women and children in them.

I don’t see how this is a mistake at all. The ROE is nested within the construct of the overarching plan (going back to LOOs and LOEs). It is part of the foundation of everything we are attempting to build there (metaphorically speaking). In this way the ROE is interwoven into everything. It is particularly important when one considers the impact of the “strategic corporal” and his/her actions on the ground.

How nice. Let’s declare up front that no one wants to flatten homes with women and children in them. In fact, we can state it more forcefully. Yea verily we say unto thee, The Captain’s Journal doesn’t want to flatten homes full of women and children. No one we know wants to flatten homes full of women and children.

I would argue that these very public statements are meant more to buttress the IO campaign—which has up until now been an uncategorical disaster for our side—rather than communicate some sea-change in tactical procedures on the ground.

Now that this exigency has been properly dealt with, may we advance the conversation forward, please? The conversation isn’t about best practices in counterinsurgency. The conversation is about rules of engagement, violation of which can lead from sanction to punishment by imprisonment.

This is a fair. Mr. Smith wishes to focus on a potential adjustment to the ROE rather that COIN doctrine and its wider application. Since it appears he and I agree on most of the doctrinal fundamentals it makes sense to narrow the scope of the discussion.

Seldom is the situation so clear as known homes full of women and children. The problem usually presents itself in a different form, e.g., situations in which the fight moves from one venue to another where the insurgents may now be mixed with noncombatants, with close air support (CAS) necessary in order to prevent significant U.S. casualties attempting to take a building by room clearing tactics.

Fine. Provide guidance unique to that circumstance and have additional briefings for deploying units. But don’t change the rules of engagement. Again, I can point to a highly successful U.S. Marine Corps Operation that wouldn’t have been conducted under such draconian rules (the operation in Garmser, Helmand Province), because certainty would not have existed regarding noncombatant presence.

Mr. Smith makes an interesting point here where he discusses the fluid nature of the battlefield where it may ebb and flow between inhabited and uninhabited areas. He talks about CAS (I assume he is referring to the Marine Corps definition of CAS) being necessary to keep U.S. casualties to a minimum. I would argue that during the analysis portion of planning, if the possibility of operating in built-up areas exists, then planners must include contingency plans (branches and sequels) to bring about successful outcomes without having to “bull-through” and risk killing innocents.

A highly successful technique being used by the Army right now is the utilization of the Afghan police and the Afghan National Army to clear inhabited areas. U.S. military forces focus on areas where there are no population centers, and the Afghans are called forward to deal with problems in the villages and towns.  They understand the language, the culture, and are largely sympathetic to the population while being infinitely resourceful. They use the minimal force necessary and get results. Since the Afghans come from a warrior culture, they have no inhibition about clearing buildings with rifles and taking casualties. It is their way of war, and the population considers them the most legitimate organ of government.

Finally, Andrew Exum says:

“We are not in Afghanistan to make sure that fewer Americans die,” said Andrew Exum of the Center for a New American Security, a Washington research organization.

“We are in Afghanistan to make sure fewer Afghan civilians die.”

No, Andrew, we are not in Afghanistan to make sure that fewer Afghan civilians die (notice the exclusive reduction of counterinsurgency to a single focus, while we have claimed that in counterinsurgency there should be focii). Making sure that fewer Afghan citizens die is a means to an end, just as is killing anti-Afghan forces, hard core Taliban and other takfiri organizations. These things are all lines of effort and lines of operation.

On this point Mr. Smith and I agree. Reducing civilian loss is a means to an end—not an empty humanitarian gesture.

I have been told that this change probably won’t affect behavior below the O3 level during a fire fight. Perhaps so … we’ll wait to see for ourselves. In any case, changing the formal rules by which Soldiers and Marines are held accountable is still ill advised in our opinion. And this meme from CNAS is getting old and worn.

I believe that Mr. Smith is reading far too much into this. McChrystal’s central message has been the reduction of the use of air power in population centers. I do not believe that this will hinder our efforts in any meaningful way—particularly if we are working in conjunction with the Afghan Army. If we continue to operate without the support of Afghan forces we will do so at our own peril.

Moreover I think he has latched on to the idea that there will be some sort of rigid modification to the ROE. There has been up until now no indication of this. The word coming out of ISAF is that new “guidance” will be issued—and guidance is flexible. I do not believe that we will see any ROE that states “If there are civilians in the line of fire then we will disengage.” I don’t believe that we will ever hamstring ourselves to that degree. At the same time tactical planners will have to take these issues into consideration during the planning phase and consider alternative approaches to clearing populated areas.

If Mr. Smith has seen a draft copy of the new policy that condradicts my opinion, then I would be curious to see it—and perhaps I might even consider snapping out of my “cult-like” mindset.

In closing, I have contacted several officers currently serving in Afghanistan (all of them “at the tip of the spear” in different commands) and none of them have heard of any sweeping changes to the ROE. That is not to say that it won’t happen, but to date there is no indication that our forces are being restricted at the tactical level or being hindered in their ability to fight or defend themselves. While our method of prosecuting military operations on the ground may adjust in the future, it does not seem as though it will compromise our capability to fight and win.

References (besides FM 3-24) on counterinsurgency:

Galula
Thompson
Trinquier
Mao
McCuen
Kitson
Stubbs
Andrade
Fall
Marston
Cassidy
Kilcullen
Marks
O’Neill

Marcus (that’s me!)

Recently General Stanley McChrystal, the new ISAF commander in Afghanistan, announced that under certain circumstances units that are under fire will break contact with the enemy in order to minimize civilian casualties. This statement immediately generated quite a bit of controversy amongst many supporters of the war effort. Most of those negative reactions stemmed from a feeling that there was an element of political correctness at play, and that the meek-sounding guidance might ultimately cost the lives of American servicemembers serving in theater. The initial negative reactions to this policy are quite understandable, but they come from a lack of understanding concerning counterinsurgency doctrine and counterinsurgency in general.

Dr. Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies has been a very critical and vocal critic of our tactics both in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March, 2009 he wrote an article explaining how our use of military overmatch—specifically air power—is alienating the Afghan people and steadily turning them against us. His article exposed some frightening trends illustrating how we are systematically turning Afghanistan into a fertile training ground for anti-coalition fighters. He points out that after our initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, and for a few years after that, we enjoyed a great deal of popularity but that has dropped off precipitously. In short, he argues that commanders on the ground are using Cold War organizations, doctrine, and technologies to fight the wrong kind of war. And he’s right.

The United States Army offers practically no formal counterinsurgency training to those outside of the special operations community. This is also largely true for the Marine Corps as well. Officers are raised within the ranks to employ units organized for conventional conflicts. These units are then sent into the fight without those same leaders receiving any formalized schooling on counterinsurgency (COIN). Even at the Command and General Staff College at Ft Leavenworth, the core curriculum ignores COIN—it is only offered as an elective to those few officers that choose to study it. With the exception of some thin familiarization training at the Combat Training Centers, officers by and large take their units to combat with little or no training for the environment they are thrust into.

Up until very recently, the U.S. military had no formalized counterinsurgency doctrine. This all changed when General David Petraeus staffed and published FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) during his tenure as Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Ft Leavenworth from 2005-2007. After this, General Petraeus went back to Iraq to apply this doctrine during the tremendously successful “Surge.”

The document—and ultimately the doctrine—itself was written by a diverse staff of military officers and civilians drawing from different areas of expertise. It is heavily grounded in historical writings on other insurgencies throughout modern history—both successful and otherwise. In all, FM 3-24 does an excellent job capturing the salient points from past conflicts and applying them to modern battlefields.

So what?

The important take-away from this is that General McChrystal is applying this doctrine in Afghanistan in order to turn the tide. He and his staff understand that the center of gravity for this conflict is the popular support of the Afghan people. In order to achieve this ISAF and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) must gain legitimacy and confidence in the eyes of the people. That cannot and will not be done if the people of Afghanistan believe that they are simply pawns in this game, and that no effort is being made to protect them. The people are the key to any counterinsurgency.

Many of McChrystal’s critics point out that we are ceding sanctuary to the enemy. This is not true at all. General McChrystal’s guidance centers around utilizing appropriate levels of force to defeat the enemy in populated areas. If you read The Times article from June 3rd of this year, you will see that McChrystal’s primary focus for this new policy concerns the use of air strikes. His purpose behind all of this is to limit the use of excessive force that results in the preventable loss of civilian life. His critics point out that this puts American servicemembers in jeopardy—these same critics make no mention of the Afghan people that are lost, or simply shrug their shoulders and say “shit happens in war.” I would point out to those critics that those same civilians are our allies and if the fighting were happening on our own soil, we would be reluctant to bring so much firepower to bear with the resultant loss of innocent life and property. Saving Afghan civilians is much more than a bleeding-heart concept, it is a pragmatic method to gaining popular support and winning the war.

Some critics of McChrystal’s policy claim that this will deter commanders on the ground from taking proactive or offensive actions against the enemy. This critic claims that Marine operations in Helmand Province which resulted in the deaths of 400 Taliban fighters invalidates McChrystal’s metrics of success that use “civilians protected” rather than “enemies killed” as a measure of success. On the surface this appears like a rock solid argument, but in fact it is founded upon faulty assumptions. The most important assumption is that killing lots of bad guys will wear the enemy down and lead to victory. This cannot be further from the truth. Killing the enemy in and of itself accomplishes very little in COIN. Successful insurgents throughout time recognized that losing on the battlefield had very little to do with the ultimate outcome of the war. In our own American Revolution we lost more battles than we won and we still prevailed. Killing the enemy for the sake of killing the enemy means nothing… protecting the people from the enemy means everything.

In short, I think General McChrystal recognizes that we have lost a lot of legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people through our excessive application of firepower. In an effort to turn that around, he is initiating a policy to use graduated levels of force in populated areas to achieve success in order to limit civilian losses. He has in no way told commanders that they cannot utilize all the tools available to protect the lives of their men and women when necessary—merely to scale it down if they have the option.

Critics will continue to lambast the policy—but I would ask those very same critics this question:

“Clearly the past policies governing the Rules of Engagement have not been successful. General McChrystal has a plan for turning the tide and regaining the confidence of the Afghan people. If you don’t like his new policies then tell me… what would you do in his place?”

Marcus